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Abstract
We propose semiparametric tests of misspecification of agent's information for games of incomplete
information. The tests use the intuition that the opponent's choices should not predict a player's choice
conditional on the proposed information available to the player. The tests are designed to check against
some commonly used null hypotheses (Bajari et al. (2010), Aradillas-Lopez (2010)). We show that our
tests have power to discriminate between common alternatives even in small samples. We apply our tests
to data on entry in the US airline industry. Both the assumptions of independent and correlated private
shocks are not supported by the data.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature on the estimation of games with incomplete information (e.g., Brock and
Durlauf (2001), Seim (2006), Sweeting (2009), Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010) and Aradillas-
Lopez (2010) for static games and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008),
Collard-Wexler (2010), Sweeting (2011), and Ryan (2011) in the literature on the estimation of dynamic
games). Because incomplete information can take many forms, it is common for the analyst to simply
choose some information structure and analyze the game under this maintained assumption. A convenient
and common assumption is that the payoff shocks that are unobservable to the econometrician are private
information from the player's perspective. This assumption effectively imposes the restriction that each player
participating in the game has access to the same information about its competitors as the outside observer
analyzing the situation (i.e. the econometrician). In this case, the equilibrium choice probabilities that the
analyst can recover from the data as a function of observable covariates coincide with the player's equilibrium
beliefs. Hence, this assumption effectively simplifies the estimation problem of strategic interactions to one
of a single agent random utility model.
While convenient, there is no a priori reason to believe that a player and the econometrician have the
same amount of information about the player's competitors. In particular, it is likely that the payoff shocks
unobserved to the econometrician are at least partially observed by the agents participating in the game.
Partially observed players' shocks invalidate the strategy of estimating equilibrium beliefs directly from the
conditional choice probabilities and generate dependence among players' choices. This misspecification of
information on the part of the econometrician will lead to biased estimates and mistaken inference.1
As a first step in dealing with this potential problem, this paper proposes two simple semiparametric
specification tests of the hypothesis that payoff shocks unobserved to the econometrician are entirely private
information. Since one of the main advantages of assuming that the player's and econometrician's information
(about competitors) coincide is the simplicity of the resulting estimators, we propose a test that is equally
simple. This first test assumes that realizations of payoff shocks are iid among players and tests against the
hypothesis that payoff shocks are entirely private information. The logic behind this test is simple: under
the iid assumption, if players partially observe their opponents' shocks but the econometrician does not,
then the players' observed equilibrium choices will not be independent of each other, even after controlling
for the observable (to the econometrician) covariates. Thus, the test checks for dependence among players'
choices after controlling for observable covariates. If dependence is detected the null hypothesis that players
use the same information as the econometrician when inferring their competitors' decisions is rejected.2
1See Cunha et al. (2005) for a similar point in the context of a lifecycle model with no strategic interactions.
2Although not exactly the same, the question we ask is isomorphic to the one in Heckman and Navarro (2004) where
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The second test we propose allows for the possibility that realizations of payoff shocks among players
are exogenously correlated as in Aradillas-Lopez (2010). Under this correlation structure, our procedure
tests the null hypothesis that payoff shocks are entirely private information. If shocks are correlated and
players know the joint distribution of the shocks, a player's realization of his own shock will help him when
forming expectations about his opponents' shocks (i.e. a signal extraction problem). In this case, dependence
(conditional on observable covariates) can come from partial observability and/or from exogenous correlation
of shocks. Therefore, we need to control for the latter factor (exogenous correlation) to test whether there
is partial observability. Under the null hypothesis of correlated shocks but no partial observability, other
players' choices net of the effect of observables, i.e. their unobservable (to the econometrician) shocks, should
be independent of the current player's choice. Since our test now relies on including unobservable shocks
when estimating probabilities, our proposed method jointly estimates auxiliary testing parameters and the
joint distribution of all players' unobservables.
This paper is related to Grieco (2010). In a similar spirit as ours, he proposes a flexible information
structure that nests as a special case the private information assumption that many papers place. He proves
that this assumption is testable based on independence of private payoff shocks and exclusion restrictions.
Unlike Grieco (2010), our focus is on testing procedures. Thus, our test is easy to implement and requires
none of these assumptions. In particular, our second test relaxes the independence of private shocks, which is
a significant step towards a general framework. Our work also relates to de Paula and Tang (2011), who use
the same intuition as our test in order to test the existence of multiple equilibria. Their logic is that, with non-
deterministic equilibrium selection rules, multiple equilibria break the conditional independence assumption.
As opposed to them, we assume a deterministic (conditional on observables) equilibrium selection rule, hence
we interpret the failure of conditional independence as a rejection of the null of entirely private information.
Sweeting (2009) performs a test to examine whether there is any time-series correlation in players' actions in
the same market, which is evidence against private information. Since his test is specific to his application
in that it requires time-series variations and many players in the same market, our first test can be regarded
as a more general and easy-to-implement version of the test in Sweeting (2009).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we lay down a simple two player game with
incomplete information in which each player makes a binary decision. We then characterize the 3 different
sets of assumptions about information we test for in section 3. In section 4 we develop the tests and show
their power properties via Monte Carlo simulation. We apply our test to data on entry in the US airline
industry in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
they characterize the informational requirements of methods that control for selection only based on variables observed by the
econometrician.
3
2 A Simple Two Player Game with Binary Actions
Consider a game of incomplete information where two players, i and j have to choose one of two possible
actions.3 Let Si denote all the random variables affecting player i's payoff regardless of whether they are
observed by both players and/or the econometrician. A simple example would be a two firm entry game
where Si would denote the variables determining firm i's profit.
4 Divide Si = (Xi, εi) where Xi is the set of
variables observable to both players and the econometrician and εi is vector of random variables unobserved
to the econometrician but observed by player i.5 The extent to which εi is observed by player j is what we
wish to determine.
Let ai denote player i's action, and let the set of actions be denoted by Ai = {0, 1}. For simplicity, denote
a−i = aj and A−i = Aj . Player i's payoff depends also on his own choice and his rival's choice. Formally we
write the payoff as
ui (ai, a−i, Si) = Ui (ai, a−i, Xi)− εi (ai) , (1)
where we allow εi to (potentially) depend on the action taken by player i. We assume that the payoff shock
(εi) is independent of all the observable covariates.
6 We further assume that both players draw the random
shock ε from the common and known distributionGε, which is absolutely continuous with unbounded support
and density g > 0 everywhere.
εi and εj are both unobserved to the econometrician, but we allow for the possibility that part of εi
is observed by player j and part of εj is observed by player i. We further allow for the possibility that
what player i observes about player j is different from what player j observes about i so there can be
informational asymmetries between players, i.e. the potential partial observability is not necessarily due to
a common shock.
In order to fix ideas we further specialize the framework and work with a simple example. Consider a
simple static entry model where 2 players simultaneously choose between entering or not. Entry of player j
affects (arguably reduces) player i's profit. Without loss of generality, we normalize the profit of not entering
to zero for both players. Specifically, we assume that profits are given by
Πi =
 hi (Xi) + αiyj − εi if yi = 10 if yi = 0 , (2)
3Extending the game (and the tests) to an n-player case and/or m-alternative case is straightforward at the cost of con-
siderable notational burden. Neither our tests nor any of the points we make depend on the simple setup we use in this
section.
4See Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002) and Seim (2006) for examples.
5We can also make Xi unobservable to the econometrician and introduce an observable signal for Xi instead as in Aradillas-
Lopez (2010).
6In Section 3.4 we discuss how we can relax this assumption.
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where yj = 1 if player j enters the market and yj = 0 otherwise. If we let Ωi denote player i's information
set (i.e. its state variables at time t) and let pij ≡ E (yj = 1|Ωi) , the optimal choices are then given by
yi = 1{hi (Xi) + αipij − εi ≥ 0} , (3)
where 1{a} is an indicator function that equals one if a is true, and zero otherwise.
2.1 Alternative Information Structures
We consider three alternative information structures (i.e. specifications for Ωi) for a game of the kind
described above. The first one is the independent private shocks (IPS) specification, in which it is assumed
that εi and εj are iid and entirely each player's private information. Bajari et al. (2010) assume this shock
structure to estimate a discrete game of incomplete information. The second specification we consider is the
correlated private shocks (CPS) specification, in which it is assumed that, while εi and εj are private
information, they may be correlated with each other. Because players are assumed to know the joint
distribution of εi and εj , each player conditions on the realization of his own ε when forming expectations
about his opponent's entry probability. Aradillas-Lopez (2010) provides a framework of estimating a discrete
game of incomplete information under this general shock structure. The third information structure we
propose in this paper assumes that εi and εj are independent but we allow for the possibility that player i
partially observes εj and that player j partially observes εi.
2.1.1 Independent Private Shocks (IPS)
In this case the information set for player i is given by Ωi = (Xi, Xj , εi). A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is
given by a set of optimal strategies and beliefs consistent with these strategies. That is, a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of this game is given by
y1 = 1{h1 (X1) + α1pi∗2 − ε1 ≥ 0} (4)
y2 = 1{h2 (X2) + α2pi∗1 − ε2 ≥ 0} , (5)
where (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is a fixed point of ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) = 0 with
ϕ1 (pi1, pi2) = pi1 −Gε1 (h1 (X1) + α1pi2) (6)
ϕ2 (pi1, pi2) = pi2 −Gε2 (h2 (X2) + α2pi1) . (7)
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Equations (6) and (7) imply that both pi∗1 and pi
∗
2 are functions of only X = (X1, X2).
7 We explicitly denote
this dependence by writing pi∗1 = pi1 (X) and pi
∗
2 = pi2 (X). The fact that the equilibrium probabilities are a
function only of the observables X is the key result that we use when designing our test of whether an agent
knows some (or all) of his opponents' ε.
2.1.2 Correlated Private Shocks (CPS)
Let Gε1,ε2 (·, ·) be the joint distribution of (ε1, ε2) and let gε1|ε2 (ε1|ε2) denote the density of ε1 conditional
on ε2. As shown in Aradillas-Lopez (2010), since now the realization of the privately observed shock ε1
contains information about the realized ε2, the equilibrium beliefs will be functions of shock realizations.
That is, a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game is given by
y1 = 1{h1 (X1) + α1pi∗2 − ε1 ≥ 0} (8)
y2 = 1{h2 (X2) + α2pi∗1 − ε2 ≥ 0} , (9)
where (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is a solution to the following system of functional equations:
pi∗1 (X, ε2) =
ˆ
1{h1 (X1) + α1pi∗2 (X, ε1)− ε1 ≥ 0} gε1|ε2 (ε1|ε2) dε1 (10)
pi∗2 (X, ε1) =
ˆ
1{h2 (X2) + α2pi∗1 (X, ε2)− ε2 ≥ 0} gε2|ε1 (ε2|ε1) dε2. (11)
Note that, even after controlling for the observables X, player i's beliefs about player j's probability of entry(
pi∗j
)
depend on player i's shock but not on εj . The fact that beliefs will not depend on εj is the key to the
second test we develop below.
2.1.3 Partially Observable Shocks (POS)
The final information specification we consider assumes that εi is potentially partially observable by the
opposing player. That is, we allow for the possibility that part (or all) of εi is observed to i's opponent. For
simplicity, we assume that the shock can be decomposed in an additive form:8
εi = ε
o
i + ε
u
i , (12)
7In case of multiple equilibria pi∗1 and pi
∗
2 are correspondences. We come back to this issue in section 3.3.
8We assume additivity for simplicity in order to generate data in our simulations. Clearly any function
εi = fi (ε
o
i , ε
u
i )
will have the same implications.
6
where εoi is observed to i's opponent, and ε
u
i is observed only to i. Neither ε
o
i , ε
u
i nor εi are observed
by the econometrician. In terms of the notation introduced before, i's information set would be given by
Ωi =
(
Xi, Xj , εi, ε
o
j
)
. Assume that εo1, ε
u
1 , ε
o
2, and ε
u
2 are all mutually independent.
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium beliefs are functions of shock realizations too. A Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of this game is given by
y1 = 1{h1 (X1) + α1pi∗2 − εo1 − εu1 ≥ 0} (13)
y2 = 1{h2 (X2) + α2pi∗1 − εo2 − εu2 ≥ 0} , (14)
where (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is a solution to the following system of equations:
pi∗1 (X, ε
o
1, ε
o
2) =
ˆ
1{h1 (X1) + α1pi∗2 (X, εo1, εo2)− εo1 − εu1 ≥ 0} gεu1 (εu1 ) dεu1 (15)
pi∗2 (X, ε
o
1, ε
o
2) =
ˆ
1{h2 (X2) + α2pi∗1 (X, εo1, εo2)− εo2 − εu2 ≥ 0} gεu2 (εu2 ) dεu2 . (16)
The key thing to notice is that, under partial observability, player i's equilibrium beliefs will depend on the
realization of his opponent's shock, even after controlling for observables and for his own shock.
3 Semiparametric Specification Tests
In this section we introduce the specification tests that will allow us to distinguish between the 3 models
just presented. Because the key aspect that we wish to test for is the specification of Ω and not to recover
the structural model, the tests we develop are semiparametric in their specification of the payoff functions.
That is, while in our discussion of the models we assumed additive separability between the direct payoff
(hi), the strategic interaction term (αi Pr (yj |Ωi)) and the shocks, the test are general enough to allow for
models specified under weaker nonseparable payoffs.9 We impose the following assumptions:
A-1 (Data) Let FY1,Y2 (y1, y2|X) be the joint distribution of (y1, y2) conditional on X. The econometrician
has access to a large number of repetitions of games so that FY1,Y2 (y1, y2|X) can be treated as known.
A-2 (DGP) Data is generated from one of the three models described in the previous section. The econo-
metrician doesn't know the true model.
9To be specific, we apply our tests in the context of the information structures described above (see assumption A-2 ).
However, the tests we propose can apply more generally (even for certain classes of dynamic games). The only requirement is
that the policy functions that arise as an equilibrium of the game are functions of the specified (a priori) information available
to each agent. With this in hand, we can simply follow the same strategy of adding the left-out information and testing for
its predictive power.
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A-3 (Multiple equilibria) Multiple equilibria are allowed but we assume the existence of a deterministic equi-
librium selection rule. The rule assigns an equilibrium based on public information. The econometrician
does not need to know the rule, but players do.
de Paula and Tang (2011) relax A-3 and account for cases in which the equilibrium selection rule is not
deterministic. Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi (2011) do not specify the nature of equilibrium selection when
considering inference of parameters in ordered response games with incomplete information. Both papers,
however, maintain the assumption of independent private shocks. See section 3.3 for a discussion on the issue
of multiple equilibria and possible alternative assumptions to A-3 . In addition, we allow for the possibility
that X1 = X2, which means that we do not rely on exclusion restrictions.
3.1 Null Hypothesis: Independent Private Shocks
We first consider the testable implications of assuming the IPS specification. In this case, both pi∗1 and pi
∗
2
are just functions of X and hence (4) can be written as
y1 = 1{h1 (X1) + α1pi∗2 (X)− ε1 ≥ 0} (17)
= 1{µ1 (X)− ε1 ≥ 0} ,
for some function µ.10 The null and alternative hypotheses are
H0 : shocks are iid and private information
H1 : shocks are correlated or partially observed.
To make the test operational we take advantage of the fact that, under H0, y1 and y2 are assumed to be
independent random variables once we control forX. Therefore, we consider the following testing equation11:
y1 = 1{µ1 (X) + δ1y2 − ε1 ≥ 0} . (18)
where δ1 is an auxiliary parameter to be used for testing purposes. The key idea behind the test is that,
10The second line makes it clear that we don't strictly require (4) to be the data generating process. Our test, will apply to
any model with the same information structure that generates the second line of (17).
11Bajari et al. (2010) also consider a model with market fixed effects. However, they assume that the market level unobservable
is just a function of observable covariates. Hence, for market m, (17) is rewritten as
y1m = 11 {h1 (X1m) + α1pi∗2 (Xm) + η (Xm)− ε1m ≥ 0}
= 11 {µ˜1 (Xm)− ε1m ≥ 0} ,
implying that our testing procedure (18) is still valid even in this case.
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under the null hypothesis, δ1 = 0.
12 So we consider the following hypothesis instead:
H ′0 : δ1 = 0 (19)
H ′1 : δ1 6= 0, (20)
where rejection of H ′0 implies the rejection of H0.
Notice that the test we propose can be easily implemented as a t-test of significance of the auxiliary
parameter δ1. One can also choose to include a more general auxiliary function of y2.
13 As we show below in
our simulations, the test performs as expected under the null (i.e. we cannot reject δ1 = 0). More important,
as we also show, the power of the test (i.e. its ability to reject the null when it is false) is remarkably good
both against the CPS and the POS alternatives.
3.2 Null Hypothesis: Correlated Private Shocks
When the true data generating process is given by the CPS model, both pi∗1 and pi
∗
2 are functions not only of
X but of ε2 and ε1, respectively. Hence, y1 and y2 may be correlated even after controlling for X. However,
once we control for both X and ε1, player 1's choice y1 is independent of y2. The test is now more elaborate
since we need to control not only for the observable covariates but also for the player's own unobservable (to
the econometrician) shock. Following Aradillas-Lopez (2010), we add the following assumption:
A-4 (Correlation structure) The joint distribution Gε1,ε2 is such that a single parameter ρ summarizes the
correlation between ε1 and ε2.
Under CPS, (8) and (9) can be written as14
y1 = 1{h1 (X1) + α1pi∗2 (X, ε1)− ε1 ≥ 0} (21)
= 1{ψ1 (X, ε1) ≥ 0} ,
and
y2 = 1{ψ2 (X, ε2) ≥ 0} . (22)
12If the game has more than 2 players, we can add δ2y3 etc for each player since, under the null, only the X's determine the
decision.
13Another explanation for the rejection the null hypotheses described above could be the presence of market-level payoff shocks
unobserved to the econometrician. In the next section we show that the test can be generalized to account for correlation across
players unobservables.
14As before, the exact model is not important in terms of testing. The test works for any model that assumes the same
information structure (i.e. CPS) and hence generates the same decision rule as in the second line below.
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Thus, for an arbitrary value of ρ, the probability that both players enter is
Pr (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|X, ρ) (23)
=
ˆ
1{ψ1 (X, ε1) ≥ 0} 1{ψ2 (X, ε2) ≥ 0} gε1,ε2 (ε1, ε2; ρ) dε1dε2,
and the remaining probabilities can be defined accordingly.
Now consider testing the following null hypothesis:
H0 : shocks are correlated but realizations are private information
H1 : part of shocks are observed.
To make the test operational, we replace 1{ψ1 (X, ε1) ≥ 0} and 1{ψ2 (X, ε2) ≥ 0} in the objective function
(e.g. likelihood) of the problem defined by the above equations with
1{ψ1 (X, ε1) + δ1ε2 ≥ 0}, (24)
1{ψ2 (X, ε2) + δ2ε1 ≥ 0} (25)
respectively. By doing this, we define a new hypothesis for player 1:
H ′0 : δ1 = 0 (26)
H ′1 : δ1 6= 0. (27)
We can define a similar hypothesis for player 2 or even test for the joint event that both δ1 and δ2
are zero. The key point to notice is that rejection of H ′0 implies the rejection of H0. That is, according
to the correlated private shocks model, once we control for X and ε1 in player 1's choice probability the
remaining information contained on player 2's choice (ε2) should not help predict player 1's choice. If it
does, it means the information structure of the game is misspecified. Specifically, a player unobservables
(from the econometrician's perspective) are at least partially observable by the other player.
3.3 Multiple Equilibria
Because recovering the structural form (i.e. the parameters) of the model is not our goal, but rather to test
the different information structures, our test is robust to the problem of multiple equilibria. However, one
important assumption we make is that the equilibrium selection rule is deterministic conditional on X. To
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see why, consider an example of IPS. If there is only one equilibrium conditional on X, we have
E(y1y2|X) = E(y1|X)E(y2|X). (28)
Now suppose that there are J equilibria conditional on X. Let pj(X) be the probability that the j-th
equilibrium is played under a certain equilibrium selection rule. That is,
∑J
j=1 pj (X) = 1. Let Ej be
expectation operator when the j-th equilibrium is played. Then, we have
E(y1y2|X) =
J∑
j=1
pj(X)Ej(y1y2|X) (29)
E(y1|X)E(y2|X) =

J∑
j=1
pj(X)Ej(y1|X)


J∑
j=1
pj(X)Ej(y2|X)
 , (30)
and clearly E(y1y2|X) 6= E(y1|X)E(y2|X). Thus, a non-deterministic equilibrium selection rule breaks the
conditional independence even if payoff shocks are entirely private information. This is the key intuition
that de Paula and Tang (2011) use to test for the existence of multiple equilibria when they impose the
independent private shocks assumption. Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi (2011) characterize the conditions
under which E(y1y2|X) ≥ E(y1|X)E(y2|X) holds, and use this moment inequality for inference of parameters
of a certain class of models.15
Thus, one can understand our µi (X) and ψi (X, εi) functions as the reduced forms of the corresponding
models provided the information structure is the same for the (unspecified) equilibrium selection rule and
equilibrium assignments are deterministic conditional on common (public) information. Note that we do
not assume that a single equilibrium is played in the data. We assume the existence of an equilibrium
selection rule that depends on X and parameters, but not on any further randomness. That is, provided the
equilibrium selection does not use more information, our semiparametric tests work for any model with the
information structures we describe.
Alternatively, we could impose the assumption that the equilibrium selection rule is such that each player
uses a different signal (independent of each other) to select an equilibrium. In this way, we could let the
equilibrium selection depend on signals that the econometrician does not observe, and our testing procedure
would be valid even in the presence of multiple equilibria.
15Specifically, Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi (2011) consider ordered response games with incomplete information, which nest
the entry game we consider in this paper. They derive a more general set of moment inequalities associated with the ordered
response games.
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3.4 Dependence between Observable Covariates and Payoff Shocks
Our test doesn't critically depend on the exogeneity assumption that the observable covariates and payoff
shocks to players are independent. That is, we can allow Xi and εi to be correlated. For example, for the
IPS information structure, a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game is given by
y1 = 1{h1 (X1) + α1pi∗2 − ε1 ≥ 0} , (31)
y2 = 1{h2 (X2) + α2pi∗1 − ε2 ≥ 0} , (32)
where (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is a fixed point of ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) = 0 with
ϕ1 (pi1, pi2) = pi1 −Gε1|X1 (h1 (X1) + α1pi2) , (33)
ϕ2 (pi1, pi2) = pi2 −Gε2|X2 (h2 (X2) + α2pi1) . (34)
Thus, the key result that the equilibrium probabilities are a function only of the observables X is still valid.
In what follows, however, we keep the assumption that Xi and εi are independent for simplicity.
4 Properties of the Tests
While intuitive, it is not obvious that the tests we propose should have any power to discriminate alternative
hypotheses. Since the tests we propose are standard t-tests, we expect them to behave well under the null.
However, it is not clear whether the tests can reject the null when they should. In order to evaluate the power
properties of our tests, in this section we perform a Monte Carlo study where we simulate the distribution
of the test statistic under the relevant alternative hypotheses for different sample sizes and different values
of the parameters controlling the departure from the null. As we show, the tests perform remarkably well
for samples of even moderate sizes.
4.1 Simulation Design
For all the different models we present the basic parametrization we use is the following. We assume that
h (X1) = β1X1 and h (X2) = β2X2. We set β1 = β2 = 0.1 and α1 = α2 = −1.5. The observable covariates
X1 and X2 are randomly drawn from U [2, 12] . Each model is distinguished by the assumptions about the
distribution of the unobservables ε1, ε2 as well as the specification of the information available to each player
Ω.
12
4.1.1 Independent Private Shocks
We assume that the shocks ε1, ε2 are independent and that both follow standard normal distributions. For
any draw m of (Xm, ε1m, ε2m) we form
y1m = 1{0.1X1m − 1.5pi∗2m (X1, X2)− ε1m ≥ 0} (35)
y2m = 1{0.1X2m − 1.5pi∗1m (X1, X2)− ε2m ≥ 0} , (36)
where pi∗1m (X1, X2) and pi
∗
2m (X1, X2) are the fixed point of
pi1 − Φ (0.1X1m − 1.5pi2) = 0 (37)
pi2 − Φ (0.1X2m − 1.5pi1) = 0. (38)
We calculate an equilibrium for each market as follows. Draw X1m, X2m, ε1m and ε2m. We then find the
equilibrium probabilities by finding the fixed point to (37) and (38).16 To do so, we follow Aradillas-Lopez
(2010) and start the fixed point search at pi2 = 1. Let pi
1
1 be the solution to (37). Using pi
1
1 , let pi
1
2 be the
solution to (38). We iterate until we get |pik1 −pik+11 | <  and |pik2 −pik+12 | <  for sufficiently small . Call the
fixed point we obtain pi∗1 and pi
∗
2 . Using these values, determine (y1, y2) from the threshold crossing model
given by (35) and (36). We calculate the equilibrium this way M times.
4.1.2 Correlated Private Shocks
In this case, we assume the shocks are distributed jointly normal:
 ε1
ε2
 ∼ N

 0
0
 ,
 1 ρ
1

 ,
where, as a baseline, we set ρ = 0.5.
Calculating the fixed point for (10) and (11) is computationally demanding since, for given X, we need
to get a fixed point of functions pi∗1 (X, ·) and pi∗2 (X, ·).17 To do so, we approximate (10) and (11) as follows.
We first choose quadrature nodes z1, z2, ..., zNs and quadrature weights w1, w2, ..., wNs based on the Gauss-
Chebyshev rule adapted to (−∞,∞). For each Xm = {X1m, X2m} , set pi01 (Xm, ·) = 1 and pi02 (Xm, ·) = 0.
16In general we do not have uniqueness of equilibrium in this setting (since we use normal distributions and both α1 and α2
are negative). Our choice is to simply use the first fixed point found. For the formal analysis of multiple equilibria in estimation
of games of incomplete information, see Aradillas-Lopez (2010).
17As before, uniqueness of such a function is not guaranteed. In practice, we use the fixed point that is found first.
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For all ε2 ∈ {z1, z2, ..., zNs} , we update pi11 (X, ε2) using
pik+11 (Xm, ε2) ≈
Ns∑
s=1
1
{
0.1X1m − 1.5pik2 (Xm, zs)− zs ≥ 0
}
φ
(
zs; ρε2, 1− ρ2
)
ws, (39)
where φ (·; a, b) is the PDF of a normal distribution with mean a and variance b. Likewise, for all ε1 ∈
{z1, z2, ..., zNs} , we update pi12 (X, ε1) using
pik+12 (Xm, ε1) ≈
Ns∑
s=1
1
{
0.1X2m − 1.5pik1 (Xm, zs)− zs ≥ 0
}
φ
(
zs, ρε1, 1− ρ2
)
ws. (40)
We then iterate the procedure until convergence.
Let pi∗1 (X, ·) = pik+11 (X, ·) and pi∗2 (X, ·) = pik+12 (X, ·) be the functions obtained from the fixed point
algorithm described above. We then calculate y1m and y2m based on
y1m = 1{0.1X1m − 1.5pi∗2 (Xm, ε1m)− ε1m ≥ 0} (41)
y2m = 1{0.1X2m − 1.5pi∗1 (Xm, ε2m)− ε2m ≥ 0} (42)
for m = 1, ...,M.
4.1.3 Partially Observable Shocks
In this case, we assume the shocks are distributed as
εo1, ε
o
2 ∼ N
(
0, σ2o
)
εu1 , ε
u
2 ∼ N
(
0, σ2u
)
and use the normalization σ2o + σ
2
u = 1. Notice that as σ
2
o → 1 all the random shocks become common
knowledge, while as σ2o → 0 then the shocks become entirely private information. The data generating
process is as follows: for market m = 1, ...,M the equilibrium is given by
y1m = 1
{
0.1X1m − 1.5pi∗2
(
X1m, X2m, ε
o
1m, ε
o
2,m
)− εo1m − εu1m ≥ 0} (43)
y2m = 1
{
0.1X2m − 1.5pi∗1
(
X1m, X2m, ε
o
1m, ε
o
2,m
)− εo2m − εu2m ≥ 0} , (44)
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where pi∗1 (X1, X2, ε
o
1m, ε
o
2m) and pi
∗
2 (X1, X2, ε
o
1m, ε
o
2m) are given by the solution to the following system of
equations:
pi1 − Φεu1 (0.1X1m − 1.5pi2 − εo1m) = 0 (45)
pi2 − Φεu2 (0.1X2m − 1.5pi1 − εo2m) = 0, (46)
where we obtain the equilibrium choice probabilities in a similar manner as the IPS case except that now
we do it for a given (X, εo1, ε
o
2).
4.2 Implementation
In order to implement estimation on our simulated samples we use series estimators for the payoff functions.
We approximate µi (X) i = 1, 2 with the polynomial:
µi (X) = λ0i + λ1iXi + λ2iX
2
i + λ3iXj + λ4iX
2
j + λ5iXiXj . (47)
For ψi (X, εi) i = 1, 2 we use
ψi (X, εi) = θ0i + θ1iXi + θ2iX
2
i + θ3iXj + θ4iX
2
j + θ5iεi + θ6iε
2
i + θ7iXiXj (48)
+θ8iXiεi + θ9iXjεi + θ10iXiXjεi + θ11iX
2
i εi + θ12iX
2
j εi.
For any given test for a fixed number of markets M and parameters of the model, we simulate 250 datasets.
In our baseline simulation we set the number of markets at 250. As a check, when the data is generated
under the null, we calculate the t-statistic for our auxiliary testing parameter in each of our 250 simulated
datasets and confirm that it fails to reject the null around 95% of the time.
To evaluate the power of the tests, we need to know the distribution of the test statistics (or the 95%
confidence interval) for δˆi = 0 under the alternative hypothesis. To do so, we use a nonparametric bootstrap
procedure to obtain these distributions. That is, when the simulated datasets are generated under an
alternative hypothesis (CPS, POS for the IPS null; POS for the CPS null) we bootstrap each simulated
dataset 250 times in order to get the distribution of the test statistic. For each simulated dataset we then
calculate the 95% confidence interval for the statistic and check whether it rejects the null. Finally we count
the number of times this happens across our 250 simulated datasets. The percentage of the time the null is
rejected under the alternative is the power of the test.
For each of the possible alternatives, we change M and check how the power of the test changes with
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the number of observations. We also calculate the power under different values for ρ when the alternative
is CPS and different values for σ2o under POS. We plot the power function against M and ρ (or M and σ
2
o)
while keeping everything else constant.
4.3 Monte Carlo Results
In this section we show the results of the Monte Carlo design we just described. As a first quick check, we
first generate 250 datasets for each of our 3 baseline data generating processes. For each dataset, we then
estimate the model under each of the 2 nulls we investigate including the auxiliary parameter (δi) that our
test is based on. In Table 1 we show the average estimate for δ1 as well as a 95% interval over the 250
simulations. Notice that these are not to be interpreted as confidence intervals and are just meant as a rough
check for how well we expect our test to behave. As is clear from the table, when the data generating process
and the null hypothesis coincide, the average estimate is very close to 0 with the interval centered around
it. When the data generating process differs from the null (i.e. when the null is false) the average estimate
is far from zero and the intervals barely contain zero (if at all).
To get a formal idea of how the tests perform, we then take each of the 250 simulated datasets and
bootstrap them 250 times. Then, for each simulated dataset, we form the t-statistic by taking the estimated
δ and dividing it over the standard error obtained from the bootstrapped distribution.18 The last column of
Table 1 counts the number of times that the null is rejected (i.e. the number of times the t-statistic is larger
in absolute value than 1.96). The same pattern we see in our simple analysis without standard errors holds:
the null is rejected (roughly) 5% of the time when the null is true and it is rejected between 54% and 96% of
the time when it should be rejected. The power properties of the test are remarkably good even for datasets
of the modest size (250 markets) we use in this baseline simulation. The fact that the test has a rejection
rate of 54% when the data is generated from the POS model but the CPS is the null is surprising given the
relatively small fraction of the variance of the shock we assume is partially observed by the agents for this
particular simulation (25%).
Figures 1 through 3 give a better idea of the performance of the tests. In Figures 1 and 2 we show how
the power of the test changes as we change the sample size when the model is estimated under the null of
IPS and the data generating process is CPS with ρ = 0.5 (Figure 1) and when the data generating process is
POS with σ2o = 0.25 (Figure 2). The power calculation is done in the same way by generating 250 datasets
and using 250 bootstrapped samples per dataset to calculate the rate of rejection. As we can see the simple
t-test we propose has considerable power even for small samples of 50 observations. The test is able to reject
18Alternatively, we could form the 95% confidence interval for each dataset and check whether it contains zero. The results
are essentially the same as when we form the t-statistic.
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the null around 80% of the time under either alternative for sample sizes as small as 200 and it rejects almost
100% of the time for samples of 450 observations or more. Figure 3 performs the same calculation when we
test whether the test rejects the null of CPS when the true data generating process is POS with σ2o = 0.25
and σ2o = 0.45. The power of the test is weakly increasing in the number of markets when σ
2
o = 0.25. We
speculate that this is due to simulation error. While the test is considerably less powerful in this case, the
power is still good given the small sample sizes and small fraction of the opponent's shock that we assume
is observed by the player. As expected, as we increase the proportion of the shock that is observable to the
other player (σ2o = 0.45), the test performs quite well.
In Figure 4 we show how the power function changes as we change not only the sample size but also ρ for
the case in which the data is generated from the CPS model and the null hypothesis is IPS. The power of the
test is monotone on the sample size regardless of the degree of correlation between the shocks. Surprisingly
the test looses power for high values of the correlation coefficient. Figure 5 repeats the exercise for the case
in which the data comes from the POS model instead and we change both the sample size and σ2o . For this
case, the test becomes monotonically more powerful for both increases in the sample size and/or increases in
the fraction of the opponent's shock observed by the player. Finally, in Figure 6 we plot the power function
for the case in which the data is generated from the POS model but the null is CPS. Although the power is
not high when σ2o is around 0.2 or 0.3, it increases quickly as σ
2
o increases.
5 An Empirical Example
This section applies our simple test to data on entry in the US airline industry. We use this industry as our
empirical example primarily because several influential papers have estimated the entry model using this
data: e.g., Berry (1992) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). Both papers assume that payoff shocks are common
knowledge. While our test cannot provide a direct support for the complete information assumption, we can
test against another extreme of entirely private information. The rejection of the null hypothesis would be,
at least, consistent with the assumption of complete information used in these papers. The second reason is
that there is potentially a lot of firm-specific information that airline carriers observe about each other but
that is not observed by the econometrician. Finally, the number of markets is large in this industry so that
our unspecified reduced form function can be flexible when controlling for observable covariates.
Our data comes from the first quarter of 2006's Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B). The
market is defined as a route between the origin airport and the final destination airport, regardless of
whether the passenger makes an intermediate stop or not. We assume that round trips are non-directional.
That is, for example, a round trip ticket between ORD and JFK is the same no matter which airport is the
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origin or destination. We use the 50 largest airports in the U.S. and exclude several airport pairs.19 The final
dataset contains 1,212 markets. We focus on the 5 major US airlines (Delta, American, United, Southwest,
and Northwest), which we simply call firm 1 through firm 5, respectively.
Each firm has two choices: enter or not enter. Let yi = 1 if firm i enters the market and 0 if it does not.
The decision rule for firm i in market m is given by
yim = 1
gi (Xim, Zm, Dm) + αi∑
j 6=i
piijm − εim > 0
 , (49)
where Xim is a firm specific measure of market potential, Zm is a measure for demand size of market m, and
Dm is a variable for cost of serving in market m. For Xim, we use the number of airports connected (by firm
i) to either the origin or the final destination airport of market m. Zm and Dm are defined as the product
of city populations for two end point airports and the distance between the two end airports, respectively.
piijm denotes firm i's evaluation of the entry probability of firm j.
5.1 Testing Independent Private Shocks
Our first goal is to test the null hypothesis that shocks are independent private information. Under the null,
the equilibrium beliefs are given by
pii∗j = pi
i∗
j (X1, ..., X5, Zm, Dm) . (50)
Following the analysis in the text, we estimate the following equation for firm 1:
y1m = 1
µ (X1m, ..., X5m, Zm, Dm) + 5∑
j=2
δ1j yjm − εim > 0
 . (51)
We approximate the µ function as polynomial on the X's, Zm, Dm, and their interactions. First we assume
εim follows the standard normal distribution. The total number of parameters we estimate is 37. For
simplicity, we test whether the δj are jointly zero:
δ12 = δ
1
3 = δ
1
4 = δ
1
5 = 0 (52)
19Several routes between several airports shouldn't be regarded as markets. For example, there is no flight between Chicago
O'Hare and Chicago Midway, and also nobody recognizes it as a route for airplanes. Therefore, we exclude several pairs that
have the same feature as this example.
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The test statistic we use is the likelihood ratio test:
LR = 2(517.0− 505.4) = 23.2, (53)
which is larger than the critical value (13.3 at the 1% significance level).
If ε does not follow the standard normal distribution, the model is misspecified and the auxiliary param-
eters may be biased. To alleviate this risk, we estimate the model under the same null hypothesis, assuming
that ε follows the mixture of two normal distributions. The total number of parameters is 39. The test
statistic is
LR = 2(502.1− 474.7) = 18.4, (54)
which is larger than the critical value. To conclude, we reject the hypothesis that random shocks are entirely
independent private information.
5.2 Testing Correlated Private Shocks
We next test the null hypothesis that shocks are correlated but private information. Under the null, the
equilibrium beliefs are given by
pii∗j = pi
i∗
j (X1, ..., X5, Zm, Dm, ε1) . (55)
We estimate the following equation:
Pr (y1 = 1, ..., y5 = 1|X1, ..., X5, Z,D, ρ) (56)
=
ˆ 5∏
i=1
1
ψi (X1, ..., X5, Zm, Dm, εim) +∑
j 6=i
δijεjm ≥ 0
 gε (ε) dε,
where gε denotes the density of the joint distribution of (ε1, ..., ε5) , which we assume is the multivariate
normal distribution with a single parameter ρ.20 The total number of parameters is 361 (340 in ψ, 20 δs,
and ρ).
Again, we test whether all the δij are jointly zero. The test statistic of the likelihood ratio test is
LR = 2(2176.6− 2086.1) = 181.0, (57)
which is higher than the critical value of the chi-squared distribution with 20 degrees of freedom (37.6 at
the 1% significance level). Therefore, we can conclude that even after controlling for exogenous correlation
20The diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix are normalized to one. The off-diagonal elements are all ρ.
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between εi and εj , the null hypothesis that payoff shocks are entirely private information is rejected. That
is, airline companies partially (and potentially fully) observe competitors' payoff shocks not observable to
the econometrician.
6 Conclusion
The literature on the estimation of games of incomplete information has paid close attention to the semipara-
metric and nonparametric identification and estimation of these games. However, in all cases, this is done
under maintained assumptions about the information available to both players and the econometrician. As
we show in this paper, a very simple specification test that allows one to check whether these assumptions
are violated can be employed. Our test checks for violation of the conditional independence implied by an
information structure. As we show, for the widely used examples of static entry games, the test can be
implemented in a very simple and intuitive way. For the independent private shocks null hypothesis, the
test consists of estimating a standard binary choice model which, under assumptions about the distribution
of the shocks, is a standard problem. While simple, the test seems to have very good power properties even
for samples of moderate size. The test of correlated private shocks, while not as powerful, still exhibits good
power properties. Our simple empirical example on entry in the US airline industry shows that both the
hypotheses of independent private shocks and of correlated private shocks are not supported by the data.
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Note: We calculate the power for each pair of the number of markets and the correlation coefficient.
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Note: We calculate the power for each pair of the number of markets and the variance of observable shocks.
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Note: We calculate the power for each pair of the number of markets and the variance of observable shocks.
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